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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a heated confrontation on the roadway, Jonathon Ellington was chased
at high speed for miles by four individuals in two separate cars.

Eventually, one of

those cars cornered, and then essentially "T-boned," Mr. Ellington's vehicle. Following
that impact, Mr. Ellington then crashed headlong into the second vehicle that had been
chasing him, driving that vehicle off the roadway. As Mr. Ellington disengaged from the
second vehicle and started to drive towards open road, one of the occupants of the first
vehicle (who was by then outside his vehicle and positioned right near Mr. Ellington's
passenger-side door) fired his.44 Magnum into the front quarter panel of Mr. Ellington's
vehicle. Mr. Ellington sped off and, in the process, ran over and killed the driver of the
first car.
Mr. Ellington was charged with two counts of aggravated battery and one count
of second degree murder. Although one magistrate judge refused to bind Mr. Ellington
over on any of the original charges, the prosecution obtained a more favorable decision
from a second magistrate judge and, thus, was allowed to bring Mr. Ellington to trial.
Ultimately, a jury found Mr. Ellington guilty, and the district court imposed a sentence of
25 years, with 12 years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Ellington contends that his conviction was a result of bias and
prejudice (much of which was brought to bear by means of misconduct), not a reasoned
consideration of the evidence. In his original Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington asserted
that: (1) as part of a much larger pattern of trying to prejudice the jury, the State, with
prosecutor Arthur Verharen at the helm, committed four distinct acts of misconduct;
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(2) the district court erred in admitting certain highly prejudicial information; and (3) the
entire panel of prospective jurors was tainted by comments made by three of their
peers.

In addition, Mr. Ellington argued in his opening brief that there was such an

accumulation of errors in his case that he was denied a fair trial.

Later, in his

Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the district court erred in
denying his motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence that one of the
State's expert witnesses had lied on the witness stand. Mr. Ellington requests that his
conviction and sentence be vacated, and that his case be remanded for a new trial.
In response, the State contends that the prosecutor engaged in no prejudicial
misconduct (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-23), the evidence in question was properly
admitted (Respondent's Brief, pp.23-28), Mr. Ellington has demonstrated no prejudicial
taint of the jury panel (Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29), the district court correctly denied
his motion for a new trial (Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.5-17), and, finally, that
there was not such an accumulation of errors at trial that Mr. Ellington was denied a fair
trial (Respondent's Brief, pp.30-31).
The present reply brief is necessary to address the arguments presented in both
the State's Respondent's Brief, and its Supplemental Respondent's Brief.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Ellington's Appellant's Brief and his Supplemental Appellant's Brief and, therefore,
are not repeated herein.
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ISSUES
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington presented the following four questions for
this Court's consideration:
1. Did the State engage in numerous acts of misconduct which, when
considered in context, render Mr. Ellington's trial so fundamentally unfair that
he is now entitled to a new trial?
2. Did the district court err in admitting certain highly prejudicial evidence?
3. Is Mr. Ellington entitled to a new trial based on the fact that the entire panel of
prospective jurors in his case was tainted by three prospective jurors who
expressed their opinions that he was guilty?
4. Did the accumulation of errors in this case deprive Mr. Ellington of a fair trial?
In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington presented a fifth question for
this Court's consideration:
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for
a new trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The State Engaged In Numerous Acts Of Misconduct Which, When Considered In
Context, Rendered Mr. Ellington's Trial Fundamentally Unfair And, Thus, Necessitate A
New Trial

A

Introduction
In his original Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that his rights to a fair trial,

due process of law, and silence, were all abridged through various instances of
prosecutorial misconduct in this case.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.30-53.) Specifically, he

asserted that there were four specific instances of misconduct-a comment on his
silence (Appellant's Brief, pp.31-36) and three blatant appeals to the emotions of the
jurors (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-46).

Further, Mr. Ellington argued that these four

instances of misconduct, whether prejudicial individually or not, were certainly
prejudicial in the aggregate, and in light of a much larger, systematic effort by the
prosecutor to obtain a conviction by prejudicing the jury with extraneous information.
(Appellant's Brief, pp,46-53.)
In response, the State claims that no misconduct occurred and, even if it did,
such misconduct did not render Mr. Ellington's trial unfair so as to warrant a new trial.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-23.)
Below, Mr. Ellington explains why the State's arguments are without merit and
why he is, in fact, entitled to a new trial.
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B.

The State Engaged In Numerous Acts Of Misconduct
1.

Misconduct Occurred When The Prosecutor Elicited Testimony From The
Lead Police Detective Which Allowed The JUry To Draw A Negative
Inference From Mr. Ellington's Post-Miranda Silence

In his Appellant's Brief (pp.31-36), Mr. Ellington argued that misconduct occurred
when the following exchange occurred during the prosecutor's direct examination of the
lead detective on the case:
Q. At the time that you got there and he was in the back of that

patrol car, was he under arrest?
A. Yes.
Q. And so you did not interview him?

A. I attempted to.

(Tr., p.236, Ls.3-7 (emphasis added).)

Specifically, Mr. Ellington argued that the

detective's testimony violated Mr. Ellington's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
because it was manifestly a comment on Mr. Ellington's silence.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.31-36.)
In response, the State attempts to argue that the above-quoted exchange did not
constitute misconduct.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.)

Specifically, it claims that:

(1) "[m]ere reference to [the defendant's] silence is not a violation of this [Fifth
Amendment] right; a defendant claiming a due process violation must demonstrate that
the state used the evidence to show an inference of guilt" (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9);
(2) there is no error when the improper comment on silence is made spontaneously by a
testifying police officer (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10); (3) a comment on the defendant's
silence is not improper absent an affirmative showing by the defendant that he invoked
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his rights under Miranda 1 (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11); and (4) to the extent that the
above-quoted exchange did constitute an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's silence,
the comment was harmless (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12).

For the reasons stated

below, none of the State's arguments have merit.
First, to the extent that the State relies on Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65
(1987), for the proposition that "[m]ere reference to [the defendant's] silence is not a
violation of his right; a defendant claiming a due process violation must demonstrate
that the state used the evidence to show an inference of guile' (Respondent's Brief,
pp.8-9 (emphasis added)), the State seems to suggest that it is perfectly proper to
comment on the defendant's silence, so long as it does not then argue that the
defendant's silence must be taken as evidence of guilt.

This contention however,

misapplies the holding of Greer and misstates the law.
Preliminarily, the Greer opinion is of somewhat limited utility because Greer, like
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), was concerned with the use of the defendant's
silence for impeachment purposes, not to imply the defendant's guilt. Greer, 483 U.S.
at 758-65. This is an important distinction because use of a defendant's silence for
impeachment purposes implicates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment (based on the idea that a Miranda warning impliedly promises the
defendant that his silence cannot be used at all, and that a subsequent use of that
silence would breach that implied promise and be fundamentally unfair), see Greer, 483
U.S. at 761-63, whereas the use of a defendant's silence to imply guilt implicates the
right to remain silent as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment (and made applicable to

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the state's through the Fourteenth Amendment), see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
612-15 (1965) (holding that, under the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, no comment may be made upon a defendant's
decision not to testify because any such comment raises the inferences of the
defendant's guilt, thereby punishing him for exercise of his constitutionally-protected
right).
More importantly, the Greer Court rested its decision on the fact that there was
virtually no risk that the jury actually considered the prosecutor's attempted comment on
the defendant's silence. Greer, 483 U.S. at 759, 764-65. Here, however, the jury not
only heard the comment on Mr. Ellington's silence, but was allowed to consider it in its
deliberations. (See Tr., p.236, L.3 - p.248, LA.) Thus, the unique facts that underlie
Greer are simply not present in this case. 2

Furthermore, the Idaho cases on this subject make it clear that a comment on the
defendant's silence is no less of a constitutional violation just because the jury was not
explicitly asked to infer guilt based on that silence; any prosecutorial arguments in this
regard would just go to the prejudice analysis. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho
296, 298-300, 62 P.3d 644, 646-48 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that unsolicited testimony
from a police officer that he Mirandized the defendant and the defendant "refused to say
anything" was error, but that the error was harmless, in part, because "[t]he prosecutor
did not pursue the officer's comment, attempt to draw attention to, or exploit the

The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously limited the reach of Greer on this basis.
See State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 298-99, 62 P.3d 644, 646-47 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The
instant case, however, is distinguishable from Greer. Here, the witness answered the
prosecutor's question, Tucker made no objection to the comment, and the judge did not
instruct the jury to disregard the officer's statement.").
2
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reference"); State v. Martinez, 128 Idaho 104,111-13,910 P.2d 776, 783-85 (Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a police officer's comment on the defendant's silence, although brief,
unintentionally elicited, and not highlighted by the prosecutor, was nevertheless error;
considering all of these factors, however, in finding that the error was harmless).
Second, to the extent that the State asserts that there can be no error when a
comment on silence is spontaneously-made by a testifying police officer, as opposed to
being directly made by a prosecutor (see Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10), the State is
mistaken. Even if one accepts the State's assumption that the word "prosecutor" in the
term "prosecutorial misconduct" is intended to describe the individual (the prosecutor),
as opposed to the group of people engaged in the prosecutorial function (including, at a
minimum, the prosecutor and the lead detective on the case), engaging in the
misconduct in question, the fact is that the label attached to Mr. Ellington's claim is not
what is important in this case.

What is important is that Detective Maskell, a

representative of the State, commented on Mr. Ellington's silence while testifying before
the jury. Thus, however one chooses to characterize Mr. Ellington's claim on appeal,
the simple fact is that the detective's comment was improper under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.

Indeed, the Idaho Court of Appeals has repeatedly

recognized that spontaneous comments by testifying police officers may violate
defendants' constitutional rights. See, e.g., Tucker, 138 Idaho at 298-300, 62 P.3d at
646-48 (holding that unsolicited testimony from a police officer that he Mirandized the
defendant and the defendant "refused to say anything" was error); Martinez, 128 Idaho
at 111-13, 910 P.2d at 783-85 (holding that a police officer's comment on the
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defendant's silence, although brief, unintentionally elicited, and not highlighted by the
prosecutor, was nevertheless error).
Third, the State claims (without citation to any authority) that (1) a comment on
the defendant's silence is only actionable upon an affirmative showing by the defendant
that he invoked his rights under Miranda, and (2) Mr. Ellington's claim fails because he
never made such a showing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) Although this argument
can be taken one of two ways, regardless of how it is interpreted, Mr. Ellington contends
that it is unsupportable as a matter of law.
One possible interpretation of the State's argument is that Detective Maskell's
comment on Mr. Ellington's silence ought not to be viewed as a comment on his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent because we cannot know why Detective Maskell was
unsuccessful in his attempt to interview Mr. Ellington-it may be that Mr. Ellington
invoked his rights, or it may be that some other event intervened. 3 The State's theory
then would have to be that it is the invocation of the right to silence, not the fact that the
defendant actually remained silent, which should be shielded from the jury's view.
However, the State has identified no authority to support such a notion.

(See

Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) And, indeed, it is unlikely that any such authority exists,
as it is the defendant's silence which runs the risk of leading to an inference of guilt. Cf.
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 612-15 (holding that no comment may be made upon a defendant's

The factual premise underlying this argument, i.e., that we do not know if Mr. Ellington
invoked his Miranda rights, fails. In fact, defense counsel's offer of proof revealed that
"Mr. Ellington at least by that time had invoked his right to counsel, or did immediately to
Detective Maskell .... " (Tr., p.237, Ls.2-6 (emphasis added).)
3
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decision not to testify because any such comment raises the inference of the
defendant's guilt).
An alternative explanation of the State's argument is that Mr. Ellington failed to
establish that Detective Maskell's comment was a comment on his post-Miranda, as
opposed to pre-Miranda silence. 4 This argument has no merit, however, because the
existence and timing of the Miranda warning (in relation to the silence in question) is
only relevant in those cases where the State is seeking to impeach the defendant's
testirnony with references to his silence.

As noted above, the prohibition against

references to post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes is grounded in due
process principles and is based on the idea that the Miranda warning itself provided the
suspect an implied promise not to use his silence against him and, thus, any
subsequent use of his silence against him would be fundamentally unfair. Greer, 483
U.S. at 761-63. Obviously though, no such rationale exists where the reference to the
defendant's silence is not made for impeachment purposes. Thus, the timing of the
Miranda warning is irrelevant where the defendant's silence was referenced for

purposes of having the jury infer guilt from that silence.

In fact, the Idaho Court of

Appeals dealt with this precise issue in Martinez, supra, holding that the preMiranda/post-Miranda distinction is relevant only when the defendant has testified and

The State's argument is also highly questionable as a matter of fact. In this case, the
evidence raises a clear inference that Mr. Ellington was, in fact, Mirandized prior to
Detective Maskell's attempted interrogation. Not only was it Detective Maskell's
testimony that, by the time he tried to interrogate Mr. Ellington, Mr. Ellington had already
been arrested and placed in the back of a patrol car (Tr., p.236, Ls.3-5), but, as noted,
defense counsel's subsequent offer of proof revealed that Mr. Ellington had invoked his
right to counsel. (Tr., p.237, Ls.2-6.) Taken together, this evidence leads to the
conclusion that Mr. Ellington had very likely been given a Miranda warning.
4
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the State is seeking to impeach that testimony.

Martinez, 128 Idaho at 111-12, 910

P.2d at 783-84.
Fourth, the State argues that Detective Maskell's comment on Mr. Ellington's
silence, to the extent that it was error, constitutes harmless error. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.11-12.)

In support of its argument, the State relies solely on the harmless error

analysis in Martinez, where the police officer's comment on the defendant's silence was
similar to Detective Maskell's relatively brief comment in this case, and where the
prosecutor neither intentionally elicited the comment nor highlighted or emphasized it in
any way. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-12.) The State's heavy reliance on the result of
Martinez is misplaced though.

As was discussed in Mr. Ellington's Appellant's Brief (pp.46-53), this Court's
harmless error analysis must be calculated to answer the question of whether "it
appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict."

Chapman

If. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). This examination necessarily entails

not only an inquiry into the circumstances of the misconduct at issue (in this case,
Detective Maskell's comment on Mr. Ellington's silence), but also an examination of the
case as a whole. And, in this case, not only was the evidence exceptionally close, but
there was a pattern of misconduct and other efforts to influence the jury by matters
outside the evidence. In light of all this, Mr. Ellington submits that he is entitled to a new
trial.
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2.

The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Seeking To Inflame The
Passions And Prejudices Of The JUry By Eliciting Testimony About How
The Facts Of The Present Case So Disturbed One Of The State's
Witnesses That He Had To Change Jobs

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct when he sought to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jurors by
eliciting testimony about how the facts of the present case so disturbed one of the
State's witnesses that he had to change jobs.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.36-40.)

questioning at issue was as follows:
Q. And at some point you worked on a 911 call that involves this

matter?
A. That is correct.
Q. Can you tell us, please, why you only worked at RMIN for two

months?
A. The simple answer is this case in particular left me with the
inability to sleep and I decided thatMR. SCHWARTZ: Objection, Your Honor, relevance, move to strike
and admonish the jury not to consider that.
THE COURT: Sustained.
A. So I had some trouble with this case.
THE COURT: Hold, we're going to wait for another question, thank
you.
Q. (By Mr. Verharen) After you worked on this particular recording
you decided not to work for RMIN anymore?

A. That's correct.
MR SCHWARTZ: Objection, Your Honor, relevance.
THE COURT: I'll let that response stand.
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The

(Tr., p.525, L.13 - p.526, L.5 (emphasis added).) Specifically, Mr. Ellington argued that
the above-quoted exchange was improper, as it was nothing more than a gratuitous
reminder of the horror of this case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-40.)
In response, the State attempts to argue that the prosecutor's line of questioning
did not constitute misconduct. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.) Specifically, it claims
that the prosecutor's question which elicited the witness's personal reflection on the
case was a valid one because it elicited relevant evidence (which was not unduly
prejudicial) and, even if it failed on this front, it was not so inflammatory as to rise to the
level of prosecutorial misconduct.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.)

For the reasons

stated below, neither of the State's arguments has merit.
The State's first argument is that "[i]t was entirely relevant for the prosecutor to
explain that [the witness's] short time working as a forensic analyst-that ended with his
work on this case-was not because of poor performance or for a reason related to his
ability to do his job well. The [that the witness] only worked as a forensic audio analyst
for only two months could have led to inferences that he was incompetent or otherwise
unable to do perform [sic] his job." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) However, this argument
is specious, given that the only reason the jury knew that the witness had worked for
RMIN for approximately two months was because the prosecutor had intentionally and
explicitly elicited that information from the witness. (See Tr., p.524, Ls.3-10.)
The State's second argument is that, even if the prosecutor's questioning was
out of line, it "was not so inflammatory as to cause the jury to determine guilt on factors
outside the evidence" because "[t]he gruesome and tragic nature of what happened was
well documented and clearly before the jury in various forms of evidence and
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testimony." (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.) However, rather making the prosecutor's
misconduct less inflammatory, the fact that the jury had already been assaulted with the
gruesome and tragic details of Ms. Larsen's death actually made the prosecutor's
misconduct all-the-more inflammatory.

Given the gruesome and tragic details of

Ms. Larsen's death, any jury would have been hard-pressed to set emotion aside and
decide Mr. Ellington's case based on the facts; however, since the questioning at issue
placed inordinate emphasis on those gruesome and tragic details, a decision based on
the facts was virtually impossible. This is especially true given that the entire case was
tried on the basis of emotion and prejudice.
3.

The Prosecutor Enqaqed In Misconduct By Seeking To Inflame The
Passions And Prejudices Of The JUry Through Gratuitous Use Of The
Phrases "Running Over Your Wife" And "Ran Over Your Wife"

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct when he sought to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jurors through
gratuitous use of the phrases "running over your wife" and "ran over your wife" while
questioning the husband of the deceased. (Appellant's Brief, ppAO-42.) Specifically,
the prosecutor began his questioning as follows:
Q. After he got done running over your wife, was he still in the
wrong lane of travel there?

A. After he came back into the correct lane and continued, then left.
Q. How long after-he ran over your wife in the wrong lane of
travel, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. After he got done running over your wife, when did he get back
in the correct lane of travel to go eastbound on Scarcella? How long after
he got done running over her was it that he got back into the correct lane?
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(Tr., p.783, Ls.13-23 (emphasis added).)

Moments later, after defense counsel

objected to the prosecutor's inordinate focus on Mr. Larsen's wife having been run over,
and the district court instructed the prosecutor to "move on" (Tr., p.783, L.24 - p.784,
L.2), instead of moving on, the prosecutor tumed to defense counsel, smiled, and asked
Mr. Larsen the following question: "What did you do after that happened, after
Mr. Ellington ran over your wife?"

(Tr., p.784, Ls.11-12, p.787, LS.8-11 (emphasis

added).)
In response, the State attempts to argue that the prosecutor's line of questioning
did not constitute misconduct. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) Specifically, it claims
that the prosecutor's question because "[t]he fact that Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's
wife was an undisputed fact on this case," and "the focus of the repeated statements
was not on the fact that Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's wife, but that he ran her over in
the wrong lane-indicating that he intentionally ran her over."

(Respondent's Brief,

pp.15-16 (emphasis in original).) The State further argues that, even if the prosecutor
did engage in misconduct, that misconduct was irrelevant because it did not reveal to
the jury anything that the jury did not already know. (Respondent's Brief, p.16.) For the
reasons stated below, neither of the State's arguments has merit.
First, the State's present argument actually highlights the impropriety of the
prosecutor's action in needlessly repeating the phrases "running over your wife" and
"ran over your wife."

If, as the State now claims, the prosecutor's intent was to

demonstrate where Ms. Larsen was in the roadway when she was struck, there was
absolutely no reason to belabor the inflammatory phrases "running over your wife" and
"ran over your wife."

The fact that those phrases were unnecessarily belabored,
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therefore, proves that they were calculated to focus the jury's attention not just on
Ms. Larsen's location in the roadway, but also on the gruesome and tragic death of the
witness's beloved wife. Moreover, regardless of the prosecutor's nefarious intent, the
fact is that the repetition of such inflammatory phrases is inherently prejudicial and likely
to have caused the jury to decide Mr. Ellington based on emotion rather than the facts
of the case.
Second, the State's present claim that any misconduct on the prosecutor's part
was essentially harmless because it did not reveal to the jury anything that the jury did
not already know misses the point of those cases which have held that it is improper for
a prosecutor to appeal to the emotions of the jury. The focus of these cases is not
necessarily on the fact that the prosecutor has presented new, or even inadmissible
evidence to the jury (although that certainly may be part and parcel of such a
misconduct claim), but rather on the fact that the prosecutor has urged the juryexplicitly or implicitly-to find the defendant guilty based on emotion rather than fact.
See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82,86-88, 156 P.3d 583, 587-89 (Ct. App. 2007)

(discussing an explicit appeal by a prosecutor to convict the defendant based on its
anger over the defense proffered by the defendant). Thus, it is no excuse to say that
the prosecutor did not tell the jurors anything they did not already know; the
prosecutor's transgression was inordinately focusing on some of what the jury already
knew-the disturbing image of Ms. Larsen, a wife and mother, being run over by a
truck. And, as noted above, such a tactic is particularly insidious in cases (such as this
one) where the facts are so gruesome and horrific that it would be difficult for the jury to
avoid being overly influenced by emotion even under the best of circumstances.
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4.

The Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct By Committing A Fraud Upon The
Court In An Effort To Get Irrelevant, But Highly Emotional And Prejudicial,
Testimony In Front Of The JUry

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct when he committed a fraud upon the district court in order to gain the
admission of irrelevant and needlessly cumulative, but highly prejudicial, evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.42-46.) Specifically, Mr. Ellington argued that it was misconduct
for the prosecutor to have offered the testimony of Dr. Ross, the pathologist/deputy
medical examiner who performed Ms. Larsen's autopsy, for the limited purpose of
discussing the direction of impact to her body, knowing full well that Dr. Ross would,
instead, simply be rehashing, in graphic detail, the horrific injuries suffered by
Ms. Larsen. (Appellant's Brief, pp.42-46.)
In response, the State argues that the prosecutor committed no misconduct.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.16-19.) Specifically, the State argues that the prosecutor did
not commit a fraud upon the court because Dr. Ross's testimony was consistent with
the State's offer of proof; it further argues that Dr. Ross's testimony was relevant and
admissible. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-19.)
First, with regard to the prosecutor's offer of proof, the State correctly points out
that the prosecutor initially offered Dr. Ross's testimony to distinguish the injuries that
were attributable to being struck by Mr. Ellington's vehicle from those that were
attributable to being run over. (Respondent's Brief, p.18 (quoting Tr., p.1243, Ls.3-10).)
The State also correctly points out that Dr. Ross gave such testimony. (Respondent's
Brief, p.18.)

However, what the State fails to acknowledge is that the district court

rejected this proffered basis of Dr. Ross's testimony (see Tr., p.1242, Ls.2-17, p.1243,
L.23 - p.1244, L.2) and allowed the State to offer Dr. Ross's testimony for the limited
17

purpose of addressing, if he could, the direction impact of Mr. Ellington's vehicle on
Ms. Larsen's body (see Tr., p.1244, Ls.2-18).

As discussed in Mr. Ellington's

Appellant's Brief, Dr. Ross never gave, nor was ever asked to give, that testimony.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.44-45.) Thus, it seems readily apparent that the prosecutor
lied about Dr. Ross's anticipated testimony in order to be allowed to get Dr. Ross's
testimony in front of the jury. And, as noted, Dr. Ross's testimony was nothing more
than a very graphic rehashing of the details of Ms. Larsen's horrific injuries.

(See

generally Tr., p.1246, L.4 - p.1260, L.12.)
Second, with regard to the (in)admissibility of Dr. Ross's testimony, the State
claims that that testimony was relevant and admissible because it "was significant to the
question of how fast Ellington was traveling in his Blazer at the time he hit Vonette
Larsen which was material to the question of whether Ellington's actions were
intentional. In other words, his testimony indicated that at least some of the victim's
injuries were caused by the impact of a vehicle moving at great speed . . . ."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.17-18.)

However, this after-the-fact justification is wholly

unconvincing, as Dr. Ross never tied Ms. Larsen's injuries to any particular speed and,
more importantly, Mr. Ellington's high rate of speed is in no way indicative of his intent
(in fact, supports Mr. Ellington's claim that he did not have time to perceive and react to
Ms. Larsen's presence in the middle of the road). Indeed, it is quite obvious that all
Dr. Ross did was to rehash Ms. Larsen's horrific injuries in graphic terms-testimony
which, in an exercise of its discretion, the district court recognized was substantially
more cumulative and prejudicial than it was probative.
p.1243, L.23-p.1244, L.18.)
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(See Tr., p.1242, Ls.12-17,

C.

The Four Instances Of Misconduct Require That Mr. Ellington Be Granted A New
Trial
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the four instances of misconduct

at issue in this case were not harmless. (Appellant's Brief, pp.46-53.) He asserted that,
regardless of whether they were prejudicial on their own, these four instances of
misconduct were certainly prejudicial in the aggregate, especially in light of a much
larger, systematic effort by the prosecutor to obtain a conviction by prejudicing the jury
with extraneous information.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.46-53.)

Thus, in his Appellant's

Brief, Mr. Ellington identified a series of prejudicial tactics on the part of the State which,
although not raised as independent claims of misconduct, he contends exacerbated the
prejudicial effect of the four misconduct claims presented (Appellant's Brief, pp.47 -52),
and he argued that, in light of the closeness of the evidence, and the State's prejudicial
tactics, the misconduct complained of was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial
(Appellant's Brief, pp.52-53).
In response, the State argues that Mr. Ellington is not, in fact, entitled to a new
trial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.19-23.) Specifically, the State asserts that no misconduct
has been shown (Respondent's Brief, p.19); there was no "pattern of misconducf'
independent of the four specifically-alleged claims of misconduct (Respondent's Brief,
pp.21-23 (emphasis added»; and the pattern of prejudicial conduct identified by
Mr. Ellington is irrelevant because the purpose of prosecutorial misconduct claims is not
to punish unscrupulous prosecutors, but to vindicate defendants' rights to fair trials
(Respondent's Brief, pp.19-21). None of these arguments, however, has merit.
First, for the reasons identified at pages 30 through 53 of his Appellant's Brief,
and above, Mr. Ellington submits that he has, in fact, demonstrated one or more claims
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of misconduct. Accordingly, it is not only appropriate, but necessary, for this Court to
engage in a harmless error analysis.
Second, the State's "pattern of misconducf' argument is nothing but a straw man,
set up just so the State could have something to knock down (in part, by citing to State
v. Zichko,129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 970 (1996)). As was made clear in Mr. Ellington's

Appellant's Brief, the State's pattern of prejudicial conduct that was described at pages
47 through 52 of his Appellant's Brief was not presented as a claim for relief; indeed, it
was not presented as a "pattern of misconduct."

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.47-52.)

Rather, it was described in an effort to put the previously-identified claims of misconduct
in context, and to show why that misconduct was prejudicial. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.47-52.)

Accordingly, the State's present attempt to show that the pattern of

prejudicial conduct does not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct is simply
irrelevant.
Third, while the State is correct in observing that the purpose of prosecutorial
misconduct claims is not to punish prosecutors' misdeeds but, instead, to vindicate
defendants' rights to fair trials, this does not mean that the State's pattern of prejudicial
conduct is irrelevant. Indeed, as noted in Mr. Ellington's Appellant's Brief, as well as

above, the State's pattern of prejudicial conduct puts the misconduct claims in
perspective and reveals just how insidious and prejudicial the State's misconduct was in
this case. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 138 Idaho 296, 300, 62 P.3d 644, 648 (Ct. App.
2003) (recognizing that part of the harmless error analysis requires examination of how
the misconduct at issue was utilized or exploited by the State). As noted, given the
details and circumstances of Ms. Larsen's death, it would be difficult for a jury to decide
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the case based on the evidence (as opposed to emotion or other outside
considerations) even in the best of circumstances; however, where the jury is
bombarded by emotional appeals and other extraneous information, that task becomes
virtually impossible. Accordingly, the prosecutor's pattern of prejudicial conduct is very
relevant to this Court's consideration of the prejudicial effect of the State's misconduct.
11.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Certain Highly Prejudicial Evidence

A.

Introd uction
In his original Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the district court erred in

three respects in admitting evidence. First, he asserted that the district court erred in
allowing the State to offer an exhibit (Exhibit 46) bearing the term "homicide" next to
Mrs. Larsen's name.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.55-58.)

Second, he contended that the

district court erred in allowing one of the State's accident reconstructionists to testify as
to his belief that Mr. Ellington intentionally hit both the girls' Honda and Mrs. Larsen with
his Blazer. (Appellant's Brief, pp.58-62.) Third, he argued that the district court erred in
allowing the deputy medical examiner to testify regarding the autopsy he conducted on
Mrs. Larsen. (Appellant's Brief, pp.62-67.) Mr. Ellington also asserted that because all
of the erroneously-admitted evidence is highly prejudicial, and because this was such a
close case, the erroneously-admitted evidence likely contributed to the jury's verdict
such that Mr. Ellington is now entitled to a new trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.67-68.)
In response, the State claims that the district court did not err in allowing the
State to admit the above evidence. (Respondent's Brief, pp.24-28.) However, for the
reasons set forth below, the State's arguments are without merit.
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B.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Certain Highly Prejudicial Evidence
1.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Strike The Word "Homicide" From
The State's Exhibit 46

Even though it had recognized that conclusory statements about the supposed
"murder scene" would be improper for the State to present (Tr., p.82, L.17 - p.83, L.10),

the district court allowed the State to have admitted an exhibit (Exhibit 46) bearing the
term "homicide" next to Mrs. Larsen's name (Tr., p.628, L.25 - p.629, L.17).

In his

Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that this ruling was in error. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.55-58.) Preliminarily, Mr. Ellington argued that the district court erred in failing to
engage in the proper analysis under Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. (Appellant's
Brief, p.57.) Further, he argued that, because the term "homicide," as used on Exhibit
46, had no probative value whatsoever, and was highly prejudicial because it would
likely be read by the lay jurors to be synonymous with the term "murder," under the
proper analysis, the term "homicide" should have been stricken from the exhibit.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.57 -58.)
In response, the State does not address the fact that the district court applied the
wrong standard. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25.) Nor does it seek to justify the
district court's ultimate conclusion by analyzing the admissibility of the term "homicide"
using the correct standard.

(See Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25.)

Instead, the State

simply argues that, because the term "homicide" is not technically synonymous with the
"term" murder, the district court did not err in allowing that label to stand on Exhibit 46.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25.)
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Because the State's response on this issue is wholly irrelevant, no further
response is necessary. Instead, Mr. Ellington simply refers this Court back to pages
55 through 58 of his Appellant's Brief.
2.

The District Court Erred In Allowing Trooper Dalv To Testify That, In His
Opinion, Mr. Ellington Acted Intentionally In Striking The Girls' Honda And
Mrs. Larsen

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the district court erred in
allowing one of the State's accident reconstruction experts, Idaho State Police Sean
Daly, to opine that Mr. Ellington intentionally struck the girls' Honda and ran over
Ms. Larsen. (Appellant's Brief, pp.58-62.) The crux of his argument was that Trooper
Daly's opinion was so patently illogical that it clearly was not an opinion that was based
on any scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge; instead, it was based on
inferences which Trooper Daly was no better equipped to draw than were the lay jurors;
and, therefore, the opinion was not admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.60-62.)
In response, apparently unable to counter the claim actually presented, the State
attempts to distort Mr. Ellington's argument in an effort to set up yet another straw man.
The State mischaracterizes Mr. Ellington's claim as actually presenting two arguments:
"First, Ellington claims that the Investigator Daly [sic] was allowed to usurp the function
of the jury by allowing the expert to testify on one of the ultimate issues in the case.
Second, Ellington claims that the expert's testimony should have been excluded

because there 'were other highly plausible inferences that could be drawn'" from the
evidence.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26 (emphasis added).)

Having so grossly

mischaracterized Mr. Ellington's claim, the State then knocks down its straw man by
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arguing that expert opinion testimony may be admitted even where it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury (Respondent's Brief, p.26), and that
Mr. Ellington cannot be heard to complain that Trooper Daly's opinion was inadmissible
simply because his conclusions are subject to dispute-both because Mr. Ellington cited
no authority for such a proposition,5 and because Trooper Daly could give the opinion
simply because he was qualified as an expert (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-27). For the
reasons stated below, the State's arguments should be ignored by this Court.
Initially, Mr. Ellington has most certainly not argued that Trooper Daly's testimony
should have been excluded because he "was allowed to usurp the function of the jury
by allowing the expert [Trooper Daly] to testify on one of the ultimate issues in the case"
(Respondent's Brief, p.25), as the State now claims. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.58-62.)
Quite clearly, such an argument would have no merit since expert testimony is "not
objectionable [just] because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact." I.R.E. 704.
What Mr. Ellington actually argues is that Trooper Daly's testimony should have
been excluded because, under Rule 702, expert opinion testimony is admissible only if
it "will assist the trier of fact," but that it does not assist the trier of fact (and, therefore, is
not admissible) when it consists of nothing more than inferences which the jurors are
perfectly capable of drawing for themselves and it, therefore, usurps the jury's factfinding role. (Appellant's Brief, p.60 (citing, and discussing, State v. Hester, 114 Idaho

5 Again, the State cites Zichko, supra.
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688, 760 P.2d 27 (1988)l

Specifically, Mr. Ellington argued that, because Trooper

Daly's opinion that Mr. Ellington had acted intentionally, was not based on any scientific,
technical, or specialized knowledge, he was no better equipped to come up with that
opinion than the lay jurors and, thus, should not have been allowed to offer it.
(Appellant's Brief, p.60.)
In arguing that Trooper Daly's opinion was not based on any scientific, technical,
or specialized knowledge, and that, under Rule 702, Trooper Daly was, therefore, not
permitted to offer such an opinion, Mr. Ellington attempted to demonstrate how
speculative, illogical, and downright unscientific that opinion actually was by pointing out
the myriad circumstances which Trooper Daly's opinion failed to account for.

(See

Appellant's Brief, pp.61-62.) The essence of this argument was not that that Trooper
Daly's testimony should have been excluded because his opinions were wrong, as the
State now claims. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.25, 26-27 (characterizing the defense
argument as follows: "Ellington claims that the expert's testimony should have been
excluded because there 'were other highly plausible inferences that could be drawn'"
from the evidence).) His point was that, just because a witness is qualified as an expert
in a certain field, that fact alone does not qualify him to offer speculative, unsupported
opinions as to any matter within that field; his opinions, in order to be admissible, must

When Hester was discussed in Mr. Ellington's Appellant's Brief, it was, at one point,
incorrectly identified as an Idaho Court of Appeals decision. In fact, Hester was decided
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Undersigned counsel apologizes for this error.
Incidentally, Hester has been relied upon and, thus, implicitly re-affirmed by the
Idaho Supreme Court in a number of cases including, but not limited to, State v.
Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 709-10, 864 P.2d 149, 155-56 (1993), Fowler v. Kootenai
County, 128 Idaho 740,745-46,918 P.2d 1185, 1190-91 (1996), and, most recently,
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 853-54, 26 P.3d 31, 36-37 (2001).

6
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still be based on some sort of valid, reliable methodology. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.6162.) And, in response to this, the State has no argument. Indeed, the State offers no
explanation of how Trooper Daly's ultimate conclusion (that Mr. Ellington acted
intentionally) could have been derived from any sort of valid, reliable scientific
methodology, as opposed to rank speculation or a mere desire to bolster the
prosecution's case.
Thus, as was argued in Mr. Ellington's Appellant's Brief (pp.58-62), Trooper
Daly's opinion concerning Mr. Ellington's state of mind was based on inferences he was
no better equipped to draw than was the lay jury and, therefore, his testimony was
inadmissible because it did nothing but usurp the jury's function. See Hester, 114 Idaho
at 695-96, 760 P.2d at 34-35; see also State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46,47-48,813 P.2d
857, 858-59 (1991) (easily finding prejudicial error in admission of an arson
investigator's opinion, based not on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge, but
rather, on inferences the jury could just as easily draw, that the defendant was the one
who started the fire in question).
3.

The District Court Erred In Allowing Dr. Marco Ross To Testify

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the district court erred in
allowing the State to offer the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross, the pathologist/deputy
medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Ms. Larsen's body. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.62-67.) The basis for this argument was that, to the extent that it was relevant at all,
the probative value of Dr. Ross's testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice and the waste of time attendant to the needless presentation of
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cumulative evidence and, therefore, Dr. Ross's testimony was inadmissible under I.R.E.
403. (Appellant's Brief, pp.62-67.)
In response, the State argues simply that Dr. Ross's testimony was relevant
because he testified that the injuries to Ms. Larsen's torso were consistent with having
been struck by a fast-moving blunt object, and that this evidence was highly probative
because "[w]hether Ellington was driving the Blazer fast, possibly accelerating, was a
relevant factor in determining whether Ellington intended to kill Vonette Larsen."?
(Respondent's Brief, pp.27-28.) This argument, however, is not persuasive at all.
As discussed in Part I(B)(4), above, to the extent that Dr. Ross's testimony
supports the inference that Ms. Larsen was struck by Mr. Ellington's Blazer, or the
additional inference that Mr. Ellington's Blazer was moving quickly at the time of impact,
neither fact is remarkable in any way. The fact that Mr. Ellington struck and ran over
Ms. Larsen with his Blazer, killing her, was never in dispute in this case.

More

importantly, contrary to the State's present claim, the fact that Mr. Ellington's Blazer was
moving quickly at the time that it struck Ms. Larsen is in no way indicative of any intent
to kill; in fact, it supports Mr. Ellington's argument that, because he was accelerating so
hard and driving so quickly in trying to get away from the Larsens, he simply did not
have time to perceive and react to Ms. Larsen's presence as she ran out in front of him.

? As the Court will recall, this argument is consistent with argument presented by the
State on the issue of whether the prosecutor committed a fraud upon the district court in
seeking the admission of Dr. Ross's testimony. (Compare Respondent's Brief, pp.16-19
(claiming that Dr. Ross's testimony was consistent with the prosecutor's offer of proof
because it discussed blunt force injuries to Ms. Larsen's torso), with Respondent's Brief,
pp.27-28 (arguing that Dr. Ross's testimony was relevant and highly probative because
it discussed blunt force injuries to Ms. Larsen's torso).)
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Thus, contrary to the State's claims on appeal, Dr. Ross's testimony had, at best,
minimal probative value.
Furthermore, the State fails to explain how it is that Dr. Ross's testimony was not
unfairly prejudicial or needlessly cumulative. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.27-28.) In
other words, the State utterly fails to address the balancing test required under
I.R.E.403.

(See Respondent's Brief, pp.27-28.)

Perhaps this is for good reason

though. Indeed, when one does balance the probative value of Dr. Ross's testimony
(which, as noted, was minimal at best) against the fact that that testimony simply
repeated information that the jury had already been exposed to many times over, as
well as the fact that that information was offered in extremely graphic, very unsettling
terms, it is apparent that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Ross to
testify at aII.
C.

Given The Closeness Of The Evidence In This Case, It Cannot Be Said That The
Erroneously Admitted Evidence Could Not Have Contributed To The Jurv's
Verdict
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington went on to argue that the foregoing

evidentiary errors were prejudicial such that Mr. Ellington is entitled to a new trial.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.67-68.) Because the State has not argued otherwise (other than
to say that no evidentiary errors occurred at all) (see Respondent's Brief, pp.23-28), no
further discussion of that issue is necessary herein.
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III.
Mr. Ellington Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The Entire Panel Of Prospective Jurors
In His Case Was Tainted By Three Prospective Jurors Who Expressed Their Opinions
That He Was Guilty

A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that his right to an unbiased jury was

violated when three prospective jurors tainted the entire panel of prospective jurors by
expressing their pre-conceived views-based on media coverage and, in one case,
direct contact with a member of the Larsen family-that Mr. Ellington was guilty of the
charged offenses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.70-72.) In addition, he argued that this taint
was prejudicial in light of other questions surrounding the neutrality of the jurors who
actually deliberated, and in light of the closeness of this case generally. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.72-76.)
In response, the State contends that Mr. Ellington's claim necessarily fails
because he cannot show that any individual juror who deliberated in his case was
actually biased. (Respondent's Brief, pp.28, 29.) In support of this argument, the State

relies on three cases: Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), State v. Scroggins, 91
Idaho 847, 433 P.2d 117 (1967), and State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58,14 P.3d 378 (Ct.
App.2000).
The State's arguments, however, are misplaced. Indeed, the three cases relied
upon by the State actually support Mr. Ellington's contention that he was denied a fair
trial before an impartial jury.
In Ross, the defendant alleged that he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights because he had to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror
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who should have been stricken for cause. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 85. The Court agreed
with the defendant that the juror in question should have been removed for cause;
however, it declined to grant the defendant a new trial because the biased juror never
deliberated and the defendant "never suggested that any of the 12 Uurors who ultimately
sat] was not impartial." Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
In Santana, the facts were essentially reversed-the district court struck a jury for
cause who, the Court of Appeals found, should not have been stricken. Santana, 135
Idaho at 63-64, 14 P.3d at 383-84. Nevertheless, relying on the reasoning of Ross, the
Court of Appeals held that the error was harmless because the defendant did "not
allege" or could "not demonstrate that a member of his or her jury was biased or

prejudiced .... " Id. at 64, 14 P.3d at 384 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court
of Appeals held, "[n]o harm can be shown where the jurors who eventually were seated
are not even alleged to have been biased .... " Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Ross and
Santana, taken together, support the very limited prOposition that, where only one

potential juror is alleged to be biased, and that potential juror does not deliberate such
that there is no question that the jurors who actually deliberated were unbiased, the
defendant cannot be heard to complain. However, that is obviously not the situation in
the present case, as Mr. Ellington has raised a question as to the impartiality of the
entire jury panel. Moreover, Ross and Santana suggest that an allegation of bias by the
deliberating jurors (such as is certainly present in this case) may be sufficient to present
a Constitutional claim.
Scroggins was somewhat different (and, indeed, more analogous to the present

case), as that case did involve allegations of an entire jury being tainted (by a mid-trial
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newspaper article that was discussed in the jury room).

Scroggins, 91 Idaho at 848,

433 P.2d at 118. Notably, although the Supreme Court denied the defendant-appellant
relief in that case, it did not do so on the basis that he had failed to show actual bias on
the part of particular jurors; it denied relief because the degree of negative publicity was
not as overwhelming as in those cases in which relief was granted because the high
degree of negative publicity created substantial risks of bias 8 See id. Thus, Scroggins
does not support the State's contention that Mr. Ellington's claim necessarily fails
because he cannot show actual bias on the part of any particular jurors who sat.
Rather, it appears to be very consistent with those United States Supreme Court cases
that have held that evidence of jury taint may demand a new trial even in the absence of
a particularized showing of bias by individual jurors. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S. at
351-52 (granting a new trial on the basis that the "carnival atmosphere" prior to, and
during, trial disrupted the trial and likely prejudiced the jury); Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-44
(declining to require a showing of actual prejudice and, instead, granting a new trial
based on the presumption of prejudice where pretrial proceedings, as well as the trial

The Scroggins Court compared the facts with which it was presented with those that
had led to new trials in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532 (1965), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Scroggins, 91
Idaho at 118, 433 P.2d at 848. In each of those three cases, the United States
Supreme Court granted new trials even though the defendant could not demonstrate
any actual bias by any specific jurors. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351-52 (granting a new
trial on the basis that the "carnival atmosphere" prior to, and during, trial disrupted the
trial and likely prejudiced the jury); Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-44 (declining to require a
showing of actual prejudice and, instead, granting a new trial based on the presumption
of prejudice where pretrial proceedings, as well as the trial itself, were televised);
Marshall, 360 U.S. at 312 (granting a new trial based on the exposure of some of the
jurors to a newspaper article portraying the defendant in a negative light, even though
those jurors promised to disregard what they had seen and decide the case based
solely on the evidence presented in court).
8
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itself, were televised); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473-74 (1965) (granting a new
trial on Sixth Amendment grounds where two testifying police officers fraternized with
the jurors during the course of the trial, even though there was no particularized
showing of bias by individual jurors); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963)
(granting a new trial on due process grounds, even without regard to what the individual
jurors said during voir dire, based on the fact that the defendant's interrogation (and
confession) had been aired on television shortly after his arrest); Marshall, 360 U.S. at
312 (granting a new trial based on the exposure of some of the jurors to a newspaper
article portraying the defendant in a negative light, even though those jurors promised to
disregard what they had seen and decide the case based solely on the evidence
presented in court).
Mr. Ellington submits that his case is analogous to Sheppard, Estes, Turner,
Rideau, Marshall, and the like, such that this Court can find that his rights to due

process of law and a fair trial before an impartial jury were violated even in the absence
of a particularized showing of bias on the part of individual jurors; he contends that this
Court should order a new trial based on the outside influences which tainted his entire
jury panel.
IV.

The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Ellington Of A Fair Trial
The final argument presented in his Appellant's Brief was that, even if the
errors made in this case are deemed to be harmless, the cumulative effect of those
errors denied Mr. Ellington due process and a fair trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 76-77.)
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Because the State's response to this argument is wholly unremarkable (see
Respondent's Brief, pp.30-31), no reply is called for herein.

v.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Ellington's Motion For A New
Trial

A.

Introduction
In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington presented an additional issue

for this Court's consideration: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a new trial. (Supplemental Appellant's Brief, pp.16-33.) That motion for a
new trial, of course, had been based on newly-discovered evidence that one of the
State's expert witnesses, Corporal Fred Rice of the Idaho State Police, testified falsely
at Mr. Ellington's trial concerning fundamental, yet critical, principles of accident
reconstruction. (See generally Supplemental Appellant's Brief.) In his Supplemental
Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that the "new trial" standard identified in State v.
Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985), not the "new trial" standard identified

in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), applies to his case
(Supplemental Appellant's Brief, pp.16-24), but that, regardless of the applicable
standard he very clearly should have been granted a new trial based on the newly
discovered evidence of Trooper Rice's false testimony (Supplemental Appellant's Brief,
pp.24-33).
In response, the State argues that the more stringent Drapeau test controls in
this case (Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.5-9) and that, under the Drapeau test,
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the district court correctly denied Mr. Ellington's motion for a new trial (Supplemental
Respondent's Brief, pp.9-17).
Below, Mr. Ellington explains why neither of the State's present arguments has
merit.
B.

Applicable Legal Standards

In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington recognized that the general
standard for evaluating motions for new trials based on newly-discovered evidence was
the four-part test articulated in Drapeau; however, he pointed out that there is a
different, more relaxed standard (the three-part test articulated in Scroggins) that is
applied, at the very least, to motions for new trials based upon newly discovered
evidence that one of the State's witnesses has recanted.

(Supplemental Appellant's

Brief, pp.17-19.) Mr. Ellington then argued that more relaxed standard of Scroggins
applies not only to admittedly false testimony by States' witnesses (recanted testimony),
but to all false testimony by State's witnesses. (Supplemental Appellant's Brief, pp.1924.) In support of this argument, Mr. Ellington asserted that the rationale underlying the
more relaxed Scroggins standard is just as applicable in the non-recantation context as
it is in the recantation context (Supplemental Appellant's Brief, pp.22-23), and he
pointed out that Idaho law is still undecided on this issue (with the Court of Appeals
having issued inconsistent opinions on this issue, and with the Supreme not having
decided the issue yet) (Supplemental Appellant's Brief, pp.19-23).

In response, the State argues that the more stringent Drapeau test controls.
(Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.6-9.)

It claims that, under the language of

Scroggins itself, "[c]learly, such a standard is not applicable in the present case, where
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there has been no recanting, and no affidavit from any government witness."
(Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.7, 9.) Further, the State suggests that Scroggins
is no longer applicable in any case, much less this one, because the Seventh Circuit
case that Scroggins was based on is no longer good law in the Seventh Circuit.
(Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) Finally, the State asserts that the idea that
the Scroggins standard applies to cases such as this one was specifically rejected
recently by the Idaho Court of Appeals, and it misleadingly suggests that this idea was
also rejected recently by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Supplemental Respondent's Brief,
p.8.) For the reasons discussed below, however, none of these arguments have merit.
First, while the Scroggins standard undoubtedly applies to new trial motions that
are premised upon the defendant's discovery of evidence that a government witness
has recanted his trial testimony, there is nothing in the text of that opinion to suggest
that it only applies to recantation situations.

Although Scroggins held that "in

appropriate circumstances, where a defendant submits an affidavit by a government
witness in which the witness recants his testimony," the three-part test applies, it also
adopted the three-part test from a Seventh Circuit case which the Idaho Supreme Court
characterized as relating to situations "where a party contends that a government
witness testified falsely .... " Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 384,716 P.2d at 1156-57. Thus,
it is apparent that the Scroggins Court, at a minimum, left open the question of whether
the three-part test applies to all new trial motions based on perjury or, instead, just
those in which the witness actually recanted. Indeed, as was discussed at some length
in Mr. Ellington's Supplemental Appellant's Brief (pp.19-23), the Idaho courts have
grappled with this question off and on since Scroggins was decided.
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Second, as was discussed in Mr. Ellington's Supplemental Appellant's Brief (p.18
n.10), the fact that Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), the Seventh
Circuit case underlying the Scroggins test, has since been rejected by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, is in no way relevant to the continued vitality of the Scroggins
test here in Idaho. After all, the reasoning underlying Larrison and Scroggins is just as
sound today as it was when Scroggins was decided in 1985. As the Idaho Court of
Appeals has since explained, perjured testimony is unique and, therefore, calls for
unique standards:
A second approach has been to treat recanted testimony as a
problem distinct from newly discovered evidence. Perjured testimony
affects the integrity of the judicial process in a way that overlooked
evidence does not. Moreover, while a rigorous standard for obtaining a
second trial upon new evidence may be justified as an incentive for the
parties to marshal evidence and to present it at the first trial, the parties
need no such incentive to combat perjury.
State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149,151-52,730 P.2d 1069, 1071-1072 (Ct. App. 1986)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoted with approval in State v. Lankford, 116
Idaho 860, 874, 781 P.2d 197, 211 (1989), and State v. Bean, 119 Idaho 632, 637, 809
P.2d 493, 498 (1991) (Bistline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Third, although the State is correct in asserting (Supplemental Respondent's
Brief, p.8) that the notion that the Scroggins standard applies to cases such as this one
was specifically rejected recently by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Griffith, 144
Idaho 356, 366, 161 P.3d 675, 685 (Ct. App. 2007), the State places far too much
weight on Griffith.

As noted in Mr. Ellington's Supplemental Appellant's Brief, this

portion of Griffith is mere dicta. 9 Moreover, Griffith is just the most recent in a relatively

In Griffith, the Court of Appeals held that, regardless of the standard applied (whether
it the Scroggins standard or the Drapeau standard), the district court did not abuse its

9
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long line of inconsistent Court of Appeals decisions on this issue. Compare Griffith, 144
Idaho at 366, 161 P.3d at 685 (explicitly rejecting the notion that Scroggins ever applies
outside the recantation context), and Caotz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 365-67, 924 P.2d
622, 627-29 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying the Scroggins standard to recantation-based
evidence, and the Drapeau standard to the other evidence of perjury),l0 with State v.
Dunn, 124 Idaho 165, 170-71, 997 P.2d 626, 631-32 (Ct. App. 2000) (applying the
Scroggins standard to non-recantation-based evidence of perjury), and Lawrence, 112

Idaho at 151-52, 730 P.2d at 1071-72 (applying Scroggins to recantation-based
evidence of perjury, but describing the rationale behind the Scroggins standard in terms
that would seem to apply equally to cases in which there is non-recantation-based
evidence of perjury), and Barlow, 113 Idaho at 578-79,746 P.2d at 1037-38 (holding
that the Scroggins standard applies whenever deliberately false testimony is at issue).11
Finally, insofar as it suggests that the Idaho Supreme Court implicitly held that
the Scroggins test is limited to recantation-based motions for new trials in State v.
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 191 P.3d 217 (2008) (Supplemental Respondent's Brief, p.8),

the State's argument is extremely misleading. Although the Stevens Court applied the
Drapeau standard to non-recantation-based evidence of perjury by a State's witness, as

discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. Griffith, 144 Idaho at 367,
161 P.3d at 686. Thus, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Scroggins does not apply
outside the recantation context is mere dicta.
10 As was discussed in Mr. Ellington's Supplemental Appellant's Brief (pp.20-21 n.13),
Cootz may not be as consistent with Griffith as it appears, as it is not at all clear that the
defendant ever argued for application of the Scroggins standard to the non-recantationbased evidence of perjury. See Caotz, 129 Idaho at 365-67,924 P.2d at 627-29.
11 In Griffith, the Court of Appeals dismissed Dunn as "an apparent inadvertent
aberration." Griffith, 144 Idaho at 367 n.3, 161 P.3d at 686 n.3. However, in light of
Lawrence and Barlow, it appears that Dunn was not "an ... inadvertent aberration."
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was pointed out in Mr. Ellington's Supplemental Appellant's Brief (pp.20-21 n.13), in
Stevens, the defendant-appellant never argued for application of the Scroggins

standard and, in fact, invited application of the Drapeau standard.
As was argued extensively in Mr. Ellington's Supplemental Appellant's Brief, this
Court should apply the Scroggins standard to this case.
C.

Under The Scroggins Test, It Is Clear That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Denying Mr. Ellington A New Trial
In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, after arguing for application of the

Scroggins standard, Mr. Ellington argued that, under such a standard, it is clear that the

district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. (Supplemental
Appellant's Brief, pp.24-30.)
In its Supplemental Respondent's Brief, the State does not even attempt to
counter this contention.

(See generally Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.5-17.)

Since the State apparently concedes error insofar as the Scroggins test applies, no
further discussion is warranted herein.
D.

Under The Drapeau Test, It Is Clear That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In Denying Mr. Ellington A New Trial
In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, after arguing for application of the

Scroggins standard and asserting that, under such a standard, it is clear that the district

court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial, Mr. Ellington argued in
the alternative that, even if the Drapeau standard is found to apply, it is nonetheless
obvious that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.
(Supplemental Appellant's Brief, pp.30-33.) Specifically, he argued that he satisfied the
requirements for a new trial because: (1) at the time of his trial, he did not know of the
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evidence proving the falsity of Trooper Rice's testimony, and his failure to learn of that
evidence was due to no lack of diligence on his part; (2) the evidence proving the falsity
of Trooper Rice's testimony is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; and
(3) the evidence proving the falsity of Trooper Rice's testimony, had it been offered
before the jury, would probably have produced an acquittal. (Supplemental Appellant's
Brief, pp.30-33.)
In response, the State focuses primarily on the "materiality" prong of the Drapeau
test, arguing that neither Trooper Rice's conflicting testimony from State v. Ciccone,
Elmore County Case No. CR-2003-4441, nor his conflicting training materials, are
material to Mr. Ellington's case. (Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.9-16, 17.) The
State also argues that evidence of Trooper Rice's perjury would not have probably
produced an acquittal. (Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.)
For the reasons explained more fully below, neither of the State's arguments
have merit.
1.

At The Time Of His Trial, Mr. Ellington Did Not Know Of The Evidence
Proving The Falsity Of CDI. Rice's Testimony, And His Failure To Learn Of
That Evidence Was Due To No Lack Of Diligence On His Part

In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that he satisfied the
first and fourth prongs of the Drapeau standard because, at the time of his trial, he did
not know of Trooper Rice's training materials or his testimony in Ciccone and, thus, was
not able to demonstrate the falsity of Trooper Rice's testimony in this case; he further
argued that this lack of knowledge of Trooper Rice's training materials and testimony in
Ciccone was in no way attributable to a lack of diligence on his part. (Supplemental

Appellant's Brief, pp.31-32.)
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The State has not contested this argument at all. (See generally Supplemental
Respondent's Brief, pp.9-17.) Accordingly, no further discussion is called for herein.

2.
In

The Evidence Proving The Falsity Of Cpl. Rice's Testimony Is Material,
Not Merely Cumulative Or Impeaching
his Supplemental Appellant's

Brief,

Mr.

Ellington

argued that both

Trooper Rice's contradictory training materials, and his contradictory testimony in
Ciccone, although clearly impeaching, were also material because they "would have

provided sUbstantive support for Dr. Skelton's calculations and opinions 12_all of which
pOinted to an accident, not a crime." (Supplemental Appellant's Brief, pp.32-33.) In
response to this, the State offers the conclusory assertion that "this is an argument
without merit."
incorrect.

(Supplemental Respondent's Brief, p.15.)

However, the State is

In fact, since both the training materials and the testimony from Ciccone

tended to show that Mr. Ellington's collision with the Honda occurred where Dr. Skelton
opined that it had occurred, and that Mr. Ellington needed a certain amount of time to
perceive and react to both the Honda (initially) and Ms. Larsen (moments later), they
supported the inference that simply did not have the ability to avoid either collision and
that the collisions at issue in this case truly were accidental.
In making its "immateriality" argument, the State also expends a great deal of
energy attempting to argue that Trooper Rice's testimony in Ciccone was not actually
inconsistent with his testimony in this case. (Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.915.) On this point, Mr. Ellington submits that the testimony from the two trials (not to
mention the training materials) speaks for itself, such that a hard, honest comparison of
the trial testimony in this case to the materials submitted in support of the motion for a
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new trial (the transcripts from Ciccone and the training materials) will lead to the same,
inescapable conclusion that was reached by the district court-that, in this case,
Trooper Rice testified inconsistently with his sworn testimony in Ciccone and
inconsistently with the accident reconstruction training materials he prepared and
uses. 13
Finally, the State raises the contention that, even if we assume that Trooper Rice
offered "inconsistent" testimony in this case, we cannot know that he offered "false"
testimony in this case (as he could have testified falsely in Ciccone instead of this case).
(Supplemental Respondent's Brief, p.16.) However, we do, in fact, know that Trooper
Rice testified falsely in this case because his testimony in this case was the aberrant
testimony-the testimony he offered in Ciccone went largely unchallenged by the
defense expert in that case, and it was consistent not only with Trooper Rice's own
training materials, but also with Dr. Skelton's testimony in this case. In light of all of this,
it is beyond fanciful to assert that Trooper Rice's testimony in this case was the truthful
testimony.

Moreover, since, as the State has repeatedly pointed out, a showing of

"materiality" requires more than a showing of "inconsistency," or even "falsity" (as that,
the State argues, would only serve to impeach Trooper Rice's testimony), it ought not to
matter which case Trooper Rice perjured himself in. The relevant fact is that both the
testimony from Ciccone, and the training materials, support the conclusion that

Dr. Skelton, this Court will. recall, was the defense's accident reconstruction expert.
As a factual matter, the district court found that Trooper Rice's testimony in this case
was, in fact, "inconsistent" with his testimony in Ciccone and with his training materials.
(Supp. R., p.43.) The State's present attempt to parse out and re-characterize that
testimony does not establish clear error in the district court's fact-finding.
12

13
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Mr. Ellington did not have time to both perceive, and react to, either the Honda or
Ms. Larsen.
3.

The Evidence Proving The Falsity Of Cpl. Rice's Testimony. Were It
Offered To A JUry. Would Probably Produce An Acquittal

In his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington argued that evidence of
Trooper Rice's contradictory testimony in Ciccone, as well as his contradictory training
materials, probably would have produced an acquittal. (Supplemental Appellant's Brief,
pp.26-29, 33.)
In response, the State simply rehashes the district court's ruling on this point,
arguing that the new evidence would not have probably produced an acquittal because:
(a) in the district court's opinion, Trooper Rice was apparently so arrogant as to lack
persuasiveness, and (b) there is some evidence by which a jury could have found
implied malice even if the defense theory of the case had been believed.
(Supplemental Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17.) However, there is no reason to believe
that the jurors disbelieved Trooper Rice just because the district court apparently found
him to be offensively arrogant.

Indeed, Mr. Ellington submits that the district court's

subjective impressions of Trooper Rice's demeanor have no place in the determination
of whether the new evidence would have probably produced an acquittal in this case.
Moreover, as was explained in Mr. Ellington's Supplemental Appellant's Brief (pp.26-29,
33), the notion that there is some evidence by which a jury could have found implied
malice even if it believed that Mr. Ellington did not have time perceive and react to
events as they were happening does not mean that there is any reasonable likelihood
that it would have done so, especially given the closeness of the evidence in this case.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in both Mr. Ellington's Appellant's
Brief and his Supplemental Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ellington respectfully requests that his
conviction and sentence be vacated, and that his case be remanded to the district court
for a new tria\.
DATED this 25th day of May, 2010.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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